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N O F O R N

**COUNTRY** WEST GERMANY

REPORT NO. CS-3/464,099

SUBJECT SPD ELECTION PROBLEMS/THE BRANDT-  
GLOBKE TALKS

DATE DISTR. 8 Feb 1961

NO. PAGES 3

## REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 13-15 JANUARY 1961

PLACE & GERMANY, BONN /27 JAN 61/

FIELD REPORT NO. EGN-1160

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: WEST GERMAN POLITICAL OBSERVER /B/ FROM A PROMINENT SPD MEMBER /F/ APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3.

1. DURING THE SPD MAYORS' MEETING IN HAMBURG ON 13-15 JANUARY 1961, ELECTION PREPARATIONS WERE DISCUSSED. THE LARGE CITIES HAD NEVER CONSTITUTED A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE SPD, BUT THIS TIME IT COULD BE DIFFERENT. THE MOST RELIABLE BIG CITY VOTERS, MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED LABOR, WERE ADOPTING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE, ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS. THE PARTY'S EXPERIMENTATION IN DEFENSE, AND TO SOME EXTENT IN ECONOMIC, POLICY HAD SOWN CONSIDERABLE MISTRUST WHICH WAS BEING EXPLOITED BY COMMUNIST AND OTHER RADICAL ELEMENTS TO UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE SPD. PARTY OFFICES WERE NOW HAVING MUCH MORE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING TRADE UNION LOCALS TO COOPERATE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THEY HERETOFORE HAD PROVIDED MAJOR ASSISTANCE AS PUTTING UP POSTERS, DISTRIBUTING HANDBILLS, AND OTHER CHORES. THIS WOULD PROBABLY NOT CAUSE THESE VOTERS TO DESERT TO THE CDU, BUT IT MIGHT REDUCE PARTICIPATION AND THUS LOSE MAJORITIES IN CITIES WHICH HERETOFORE WOULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS FAIRLY SAFE.

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COORDINATING RELATIONS	
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**LIAISON**

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2. MAYOR WILLY BRANDT WAS ASKED WHAT PERSONAL ATTACKS HE EXPECTED AND HOW HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD HAD A TALK WITH STATE SECRETARY HANS GLOBKE JUST BEFORE CHRISTMAS ON THE LATTERS INITIATIVE. GLOBKE TOLD HIM THAT HE EXPECTED A NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIMSELF AT ANY TIME, WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD INTENSIFY AS THE EICHMANN TRIAL DATE APPROACHES. GLOBKE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO KEEP THESE COMMUNIST ATTACKS FROM BEING TAKEN UP IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, PARTICULARLY DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. ANY DEFAMATION DURING THE CAMPAIGN WOULD ULTIMATELY HARM WEST GERMANY'S POSITION, NO MATTER WHO CAME TO POWER IN SEPTEMBER. GLOBKE SAID THAT DIGGING INTO THE PAST WOULD HAVE TO STOP IF THE PEOPLE WERE EVER TO FIND THEIR PEACE INTERNALLY. IT WAS GLOBKE'S CONVICTION THAT THIS WOULD BE TRUE FOR BOTH SIDES IN THE ELECTION CONTEST.

3. GLOBKE SAID THAT IF BRANDT COULD PLEDGE THAT HIS PARTY WOULD REFRAIN FROM EXPLOITING COMMUNIST CHARGES, HE WOULD PREVAIL UPON THE CDU NOT TO MAKE PERSONAL ATTACKS UPON BRANDT. THE WELL-KNOWN CRITICISMS OF BRANDT FOR HIS WARTIME AND IMMEDIATE POSTWAR ACTIVITIES FALL INTO THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF, SAID GLOBKE, IN THAT THEY, TOO, MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

4. BRANDT FELT THAT GLOBKE WAS SERIOUS AND WAS NOT TRYING TO TRAP HIM. BRANDT THEREFORE FELT THAT HE SHOULD ENSURE THAT HIS PARTY WOULD NOT USE SUCH MATERIAL AGAINST GLOBKE AND, GENERALLY, REFRAIN FROM USING THE NAZI PAST AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE, ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT THE STATE SECRETARY LIVED UP TO HIS END OF THE BARGAIN.

5. BRANDT'S STATEMENT WAS AT FIRST ACCEPTED WITH SOME RELIEF, BUT IN LATER INFORMAL, PRIVATE TALKS, SOME MAYORS EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS WISE, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN MADE WITH SPD VICE CHAIRMAN HERBERT WEHNER'S PARTICIPATION. SOME

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PRIVATE CRITICISM WAS ALSO DIRECTED AGAINST BRANDT FOR MAKING SUCH  
A COMMITMENT FOR PERSONAL REASONS, LEAVING THE WAY OPEN FOR THE  
SAME OLD CHARGES THAT HAD BEEN LEVELLED AGAINST THE PARTY IN THE  
1957 CAMPAIGN. FIELD COMMENT- PRESUMABLY SUCH CHARGES AS BEING  
UNWITTING TOOLS OF THE COMMUNISTS, OPPOSING THE NATO DEFENSE RELATION-  
SHIP, AND AS A PARTY OF TREASON./

G. C. H. H. H. H. H.

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